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University of Notre Dame, Department of Physics,
225 Nieuwland Science Hall, Notre Dame, IN 46556 USA
Epidemics, neural cascades, power failures, and many other phenomena can be described by a
diffusion process on a network. To identify the causal origins of a spread, it is often necessary to
identify the triggering initial node. Here we define a new morphological operator and use it to detect
the origin of a diffusive front, given the final state of a complex network. Our method performs
better than algorithms based on distance (closeness) and Jordan centrality. More importantly, our
method is applicable regardless of the specifics of the forward model, and therefore can be applied to
a wide range of systems such as identifying the patient zero in an epidemic, pinpointing the neuron
that triggers a cascade, identifying the original malfunction that causes a catastrophic infrastructure
failure, and inferring the ancestral species from which a heterogeneous population evolves.
A sugar piece placed in tea will erode and eventually
dissolve. Given the initial shape of the piece, it is trivial
to predict its final distribution. However, the opposite
problem of determining the initial state, given a final
one is extremely difficult. Problems of the latter kind
are referred as ill-posed inverse problems [1–3].
Diffusion taking place on networks, in the forward di-
rection, is well studied. One class of models originally
used to describe epidemics is the Susceptible-Infected-
Recovered (SIR) model [4, 5]. Variations include SI, SIS,
SIRS, etc. Others include more realistic delay conditions,
such as an incubation period for the infection [6]. Simi-
lar models are used to describe neural cascades [7], traffic
jams [8] and infrastructure failures [9].
Accordingly, a successful method of inverting diffusion
on complex networks can help identify patient zero in an
epidemic outbreak, pinpoint neurons that trigger a cogni-
tive cascades, remedy the parts of the road network that
initiate congestion, and determine malfunctions that lead
to cascading failures. In the weak selection limit, evolu-
tion can be thought as diffusion on a genotype network
[10, 11], so diffusion inversion may be used to identify
ancestral species.
Here we address the problem of identifying the origin
of a diffusive process taking place on a complex network,
given the its final state. We refer to the influenced nodes
as the candidate set C. Any member of C may be the
node from which the diffusion originated. We refer to
this node as the seed, s, and to the forward model as M .
Presently, there are two approaches to identify s. The
first uses probability marginals from Bayesian methods
[12–21]. In some cases, it is possible to sample the state
space using Monte Carlo simulations [13]. However, this
is only feasible for small networks. Message-passing algo-
rithms can approximate the marginals efficiently [12, 14–
16], however these algorithms are model specific: for ev-
ery M , one must invent new approximations, heuristic
assumptions and analytic calculations.
In contrast, the second class of methods works inde-
pendent of the forward model [14, 17–19]. These presup-
pose that s should be approximately equidistant to all
other nodes in C, and therefore, nodes with high “cen-
trality” values should have a higher likelihood of being
s. This assumption breaks down if the spread reaches
“boundaries”, or if the spread self-interacts (i.e. if the
network contains many loops rather than being a tree or
a dynamic like SIS).
Here we present a method that can determine the ori-
gin of a diffusive process taking place on a complex net-
work, regardless of what the diffusion model is, without
the drawbacks of centrality based methods. We take as
inputs the network structure, the candidate set C, and
the forward model M . In return, we output a list of
nodes, ordered according to the likelihood of being the
seed s. We emphasize that our method has no free pa-
rameters and is applicable to any M , including both de-
terministic and stochastic forward models.
To evaluate our success, we performed simulations in
the forward direction using 4 types of forward models
on 3 different graph topologies. We then inverted the
final state, and determined how often our guess is the
true seed. We also measured the error distance, i.e the
distance of our guess from the true seed.
The forward models we explored are Susceptible-
Infected (SI) epidemic model with uniform propagation
probability between neighboring nodes; an Information
Cascade (IC) model which propagates the diffusion like
the SI model but with an additional cascade effect based
on the fraction of infected neighbors [22]; a Collective
Behavior (CB) model based on the notion that social be-
havior is determined by threshold for when the benefit
of an action is greater than its cost [23]; a heterogeneous
SI model where the propagation probability has a direc-
tional bias (DB) based on spatial positions of the nodes.
The network topologies on which we evaluate our
model consist of a real power grid (GRID) network of the
western states of the USA [24], a real protein (PROT) in-
teraction network of C. elegans [25], and a synthetic scale
free (SCLF) network based on the power grid network.
The spread time was selected such that none of the
networks tested was fully saturated by the spread. This
allows the final state to retain some unique characteristics
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FIG. 1. Example of classical erosion (a,b), our gen-
eralization (c,d), erosion on a network (e). (a): The
structuring element (“stencil”) is placed on individual pixels
whose neighborhoods are checked for a match/mismatch. (b):
Pixels are eroded if there is a mismatch with the stencil. In
the end, shapes lose their outer layers. (c): the network and
candidate set (solid fill) is given while the seed (dark star)
is unknown. (d): the erosion stencil (gradient fill) for candi-
date i (light star) is applied over the network. Smiley faces
show the locations where the stencil matches the given net-
work state, question marks show locations of high variability,
and sad faces show regions where the stencil does not match
the candidate set. Note that the planar representation for the
stencils does not mean that our stencils are limited to planar
graphs. All nodes are part of the stencil for any given node
for a general diffusion dynamic. (e): An example of determin-
istic diffusion of a single seed for one discrete time step. The
necessary stencil is one in which all neighbors are affected by
the diffusion but no one else because there is not enough time
to reach anything outside of direct neighbors. For this reason,
the node in the top left was also eroded.
that can be used to identify the seed. We did not explore
cases for low propagation probability and large spreads
in order to maintain a consistent total simulated time,
T = 5, for all models.
Generalized Morphological Operators. The prin-
ciple behind our method can be best described by
the language of mathematical morphology pioneered by
Minkowski, Matheron, Serra and others [26–28]. A mor-
phological operator modifies every point in a set (e.g. an
image) according to the spatial arrangement of neighbor-
ing points. A stencil, called the “structuring element”,
with a predefined shape is placed on individual points,
and if the surroundings of the point match (or not match)
the shape of the stencil, then the point is modified. One
particular operator, “erosion”, is important for our pur-
pose. Erosion, deletes all points whose surroundings mis-
match the structuring element. Since a mismatch would
typically happen near the boundaries of a shape, the ero-
sion filter ends up rounding up and thinning down all
shapes. This is the qualitative behavior we need in order
get rid of the peripheral nodes of C and reach its core.
To suit our specific purpose, we define a new morpho-
logical operator analogous to erosion, but with three im-
portant differences (Figure 1). First, our structuring el-
ement is not fixed, but changes according to where it is
placed on the network. Furthermore, our structuring el-
ement does not have sharp edges, but is fuzzy. To be
precise, we take the structuring element, when placed on
i, to be P (j|i), which we compute numerically.
Secondly, the comparison of the structuring element
and the surrounding nodes of i is not binary, but
weighted. This is because mismatches of deterministic
events (e.g. P (i|j) ∼ 0 or 1) matter more than random
events (P (i|j) ∼ 0.5). To be precise we weight every
node mismatch with a factor inversely proportional to
the binary entropy Hb(P (j|i)).
Thirdly, the final effect of processing a node with a
structuring element is not simply deleting or keeping. In-
stead, this too is fuzzy. In the end, upon applying our
morphological operator to the network once, we expect
the least eroded node to be the seed.
Our algorithm generates an ordered list of candidate
seeds based on how much they are eroded. The best case
scenario is when the true origin is located at the top of
this list. Fig. 1 schematically shows an evaluation of the
match between an erosion stencil and the given network
state along with an example of classical image erosion.
Method. The structuring elements are generated by
directly sampling the states of the network model. For
each forward model (defined explicitly in the next sec-
tion), we applied the selected diffusion dynamics 500
times for every node in the network and calculated the
structuring element, P (i|j), based on the normalized fre-
quency of finding node i affected by the diffusion starting
from node j.
We define a convergence condition for our stencils
based on the average absolute error of the probabilities
after moving to a higher sample size. For a sample size
n, we require that the average error, δP , be less than 1%
after moving to a sample size of 5n:
δP = max
λ∈(0.1,0.5,0.95)
∑
i,j
|P 5nλ (i|j)− P
n
λ (i|j)| ≤ 0.01.
Naturally the error will depend upon the diffusion param-
eters and the network topology. However, we found that
it is reasonable to just sample the errors using the largest
network for a subset of the diffusion parameters. For
the most part, our algorithm convergences very quickly
3where the final sample size for the stencils was 500 runs
for each node in the network.
The idea behind our morphological filter is to deter-
mine which stencil has the best match with the given
diffusion state. The likelihood of a node being the origin
node is proportional to the similarity between its stencil
and the diffusion state. However, there are many ways to
measure the similarity between a probability vector and
a binary vector. We sampled the performance of different
scoring metrics such as log-likelihood (under independent
3-body correlations), information surprisal, and Picard
distance. The results shown in this paper are based on
the an information theoretical metric which we found to
work best. For each node i inside the candidate set C,
we apply an erosion score:
Si =
∑
j
1− P (j|i)
Hb(P (j|i))
,
where the weight Hb(x) = x log2 x+(1−x) log2(1−x) is
the binary entropy. In other words, Si measures the mis-
match between the stencil and diffusion state weighted
by the (binary) entropy, Hb, of the probability distribu-
tion. This weight will diminish the value of nodes with
high variability (p ≈ 0.5) in comparison to nodes with low
variability (p ≈ 0 or p ≈ 1). If the probability that a node
is affected is very high or very low, then matches (mis-
matches) are weighted heavily and have a large negative
(positive) influence on Si. On the other hand, the state
of highly variable nodes are circumstantial, and thanks
to the small entropic weight they do not have much in-
fluence on Si. Note that the score for candidate node i
examines its stencil element, P (j|i), at every other node
j. In other words, the stencil for any node involves all
other nodes in the network and not just the nodes in the
set C.
Once we have Si for all i we sort these in ascending
order and pick the nodes with best (i.e. lowest) scores.
Numerically, the entropic weight can result in a division
by zero, and therefore instead of directly using P (j|i) we
used P (j|i) + ǫ, where ǫ = 10−20 is small enough to not
change the degree of variability and instead provide an
upper bound for a highly unexpected mismatch. If the
relevant forward dynamics is one where nodes can take
more than two states, then the binary entropy function
should be updated to be the entropy for the probability
stencil of node i causing node j to be in state r:
H =
∑
r
P (r, j|i) loge P (r, j|i)
The error bars generated are based on the standard
deviation of our results. For each network topology and
diffusion model we simulated 500 realizations of the dif-
fusion in order to test the performance of our algorithm.
We separated these into 5 sets of 100 simulations by ran-
dom assignment. We then calculated our performance
inside each of the sets separately and used their standard
deviation for our errors. We then repeated the random
assignment 100 times and averaged over all of the stan-
dard deviations. This removes the dependence on how
the simulations were randomly assigned as well as pro-
vide a measure of “error” for a trial containing 100 sim-
ulations. Additionally, some realizations will not have a
candidate set larger than one when the spread probabil-
ity is very small. We simply remove these cases from our
calculation and therefore the actual sample size for low
λ (≈ 250) is lower than for λ > 0.80% (500).
Networks and Forward Dynamics. To evaluate
our inversion scheme, we used a protein-protein inter-
action network [25], a power grid network [24], and a
synthetic scale-free network. Our diffusion dynamics are
discrete in time and are fully described by the probability
that an “infected” node spreads to a susceptible neighbor.
The SI model is defined by the probability pij = λAijIj
of an infection spreading from j to i, where Aij is one
when nodes i and j are connected by an edge and zero
otherwise and Ij is one if node j is infected and zero oth-
erwise. Which simplifies to j infecting i with probability
λ = [0.05, 0.1, ..., 0.95] only if the two nodes are adjacent
and j is infected.
The IC model cascades the information spread based
on the state of a critical fraction of neighbors, ν = 0.5,
via:
pij =
{
1,
∑
j Aij(Ij − ν) ≥ 0,
λAijIj ,
∑
j Aij(Ij − ν) < 0.
(1)
The CB model spreads the adaptation of a social behav-
ior when the number of neighbors who have adopted the
behavior reaches an absolute threshold, µ = 2, via:
pij =
{
1,
∑
j AijIj ≥ µ,
λAijIj ,
∑
j AijIj < µ.
(2)
The DB model uses heterogeneous diffusion probabilities
pij = BijIj , where Bij = Aij(p0+δp cos( ~dij ·~b)). The DB
model is generated by first randomizing the three dimen-
sional positions for all nodes placed uniformly random
inside a unitary volume and then calculating the unit
displacement vector, ~dij , between graphically (Aij = 1)
adjacent nodes. We then picked a unit bias vector, ~b,
pointing towards one of the corners of the volume and
generated the weighted adjacency matrix Bij based on
a neutral transmission probability p0 = [0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8]
and range δp = 0.15.
Distance and Jordan Centrality. The origin of
a diffusion process can prima facie be expected to be
found near the “center” of the candidate set. Thus, we
compare our results with two benchmark methods based
on centrality measures (Fig.2). Centrality based methods
calculate the distances between pairs of candidate nodes
(i, j), Dij , inside the subgraph generated by only their
4connections. This means that each diffusion will require
a new calculation of the distances because the candidate
nodes will generally never be the same set of nodes. The
distance (closeness) centrality Di of a node i refers to the
total distance between node i and all other candidate
nodes j.
Di =
∑
j∈C
Dij
This method assumes that the node which has the least
distance to all other candidate nodes is the most likely
seed. The Jordan centrality Ji of a node i is concerned
only with the largest distances between node i and all
other candidate nodes.
Ji = max
j∈C
Dij
Similar to the distance centrality, this method assumes
that the most likely candidate node is the least distant
to all other candidate nodes.
Numerical Algorithm. Given a graph G(V,E), for-
ward diffusion model, and total time T , and realization
R to be inverted, we enumerate the necessary steps to
use our algorithm.
1. Generate the candidate set C based on R. For SI
dynamics, the set C contains every node which is
in state I.
2. For every node j ∈ C, apply the diffusion dynamic
for total time T and repeat for a total of M inde-
pendent trails. Record the probability that node
i ∈ V was affected by the diffusion, P (i|j).
3. Calculate the erosion score for every node j ∈ C
via:
Sj =
∑
i
1− P (i|j)
Hb(P (j|i))
.
4. Assign ranks to every candidate node based on their
scores. The lowest score has the first rank and is
the most likely candidate based on our erosion.
Our current scheme is based only on SI-type dynamics.
For dynamics with additional states such as SIR, the can-
didate set must be carefully considered. In the most sim-
ple case, the candidate can be the entire graph. Addition-
ally, the stencil will gain an additional dimension which
categorizes the state w of node i for a diffusion starting
from node j, P (w, i|j). The erosion score must also use
the entropy rather than the binary entropy.
Results. Many authors use distance error as a metric
of success [13, 14, 19, 21], however the usefulness of this
metric is ambiguous. Although a two-hop range consti-
tutes a small fraction of the network (0.2%, 1%, 5% for
GRID, SCLF, and PROT respectively), such small per-
centages still correspond to a significant absolute number
of nodes (10, 50, and 210 nodes for GRID, SCLF, and
PROT respectively). We provide the results for the dis-
tance error of our algorithm in the Appendix, and here,
only focus on the probability of finding the true seed and
the rank distribution of the true seed. All simulated runs
were done on the Notre Dame Center for Research Com-
puting’s High Performance Computing clusters.
Figure 2 shows how often the true seed is our top guess
and how often it is within our top three guesses. The bold
solid lines show the performance of our algorithm, while
the dashed and dotted lines show the performance of dis-
tance centrality and Jordan centrality based methods.
Our success rates are far above the dashed and dotted
curves of the same color, with the only exception of the
low λ regime of the IC model.
Figure 3 show the ranking spectrum for the true seed
using the three methods for λ = 0.2 (p0 = 0.2) and T =
5. The protein/scale-free network has a heavy tail in
comparison to the grid network because the spread can
quickly reach many more nodes within T = 5 on the
protein/scale-free network.
On average the radius of C is 〈r〉 = Tλ nodes. As λ→
0, there are few nodes to pick from, and thus centrality
based methods, including just randomly selecting a node
from C, gives similarly high success rates as our method.
As λ is increased however, the difference between our
method and others increase significantly. The difference
in success is maximal when the number of affected nodes
become maximum, at λ→ 1. Across all forward models,
we have least success when the spread probability λ ∼
0.5, the regime with the highest number of possible states
due to the high variability in the stochastic process. This
variability causes the calculated average stencil to very
rarely match a given diffusion state.
Discussion. In general, stochastic dynamics on net-
works will be defined in terms of local properties rather
than global ones. To this extent we explored two main
variations to a local property, i.e. models in which frac-
tional versus absolute number of affected neighbors de-
termining the spread probability. We have also shown
that our algorithm performs well for non-uniform and
directionally-biased diffusion. Hence, we have explored,
nearly to full extent, the inversion of two state diffusion
processes on complex networks.
Our algorithm is a general method for determining the
source of diffusion dynamics on complex networks. While
the generation of morphological stencils requires knowing
the dynamic law as well as the states of all nodes at some
final time, our approach works for all models. In contrast,
other inversion schemes are model-specific [12, 16, 19, 20].
Even though our inversion scheme works for any model,
it is not model invariant like the centrality based methods
which uses only topological properties in the graph. The
core part of our algorithm relies on an “erosion” of the
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FIG. 2. Performance on different networks and models as a function of the transmission probability λ, for
T = 5 (larger is better). The protein interaction network (n = 3744, m = 7749), power grid network (n = 4941, m = 6594),
and scale-free network (n = 4941, m = 6601) are shown in each column. The four dynamic models are shown in each row. Note
the difference between the uniform transmission probability, λ, for isotropic diffusion and the neutral transmission probability,
p0, for anisotropic diffusion. Our performance (solid lines) is almost always better than centrality based methods (dashed and
dotted lines of the same color) based on a total of 500 runs. Light-red and dark-blue curves denote whether the true seed is
the top one or within top three choices returned respectively. For the power grid network, both cases overlapped because the
candidate set is small. The error bars represent ± one expected standard deviation for an average of 100 runs. In general, our
performance closely matches the two centrality methods but becomes noticeably better as λ or p0 increases.
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FIG. 3. Probability that the true seed is a high-ranked node for all models and dynamics using λ = 0.6
(p0 = 0.6) T = 5 (lower rank is better). The protein interaction network (n = 3744, m = 7749), power grid network
(n = 4941, m = 6594), and scale-free network (n = 4941, m = 6601) are shown in each column. The four dynamic models are
shown in each row. The protein and scale-free networks have larger spreads than the grid network and therefore will have a
larger distribution for the rank sizes. Our method (solid lines) generally outperforms the two centrality methods based on a
total of 500 runs. Note that Jordan centrality provides much better performance than distance (closeness) centrality. The error
bars represent ± one expected standard deviation for an average of 100 runs.
diffusion surface by the diffusion stencils for each point in
the spread. We need to know the specifics of the forward
model in order to generate these diffusion stencils.
The performance of our algorithm may be improved by
de-generalizing the scoring function to accommodate par-
ticularities of a forward model. We also note that there
are many aspects of the problem we have not yet consid-
ered, such as cases of incomplete or noisy information,
7dynamics of multi-state diffusion, and even multi-source
diffusion [12, 13, 15, 16, 20, 21].
Such generalizations should be within reach: in the
case of multi-source, one could generate a scoring met-
ric which is non-symmetric against the diffusion state.
In other words, the scoring could prioritize matching the
diffusion state rather than the base state. In the case
of multi-state diffusion, one could introduce a transition
matrix for the states where the elements of this matrix
represents how easy/difficult it is to transition from one
state to another. This matrix must be embedded into the
scoring metric such that mismatches in state are weighted
by the elements of this matrix. Additionally, some meth-
ods use a reduction scheme which considers more complex
dynamic as two “compartments.” For example, [13] uses
a SIR dynamic but then groups the status of I and R
into the single compartment for their Jaccard similarity
measure which uses a binary status.
We now compare and contrast our method with an-
other that is most similar in spirit to ours. Antulov-
Fantulin et al. [13] uses a Jaccard similarity function
to characterize the similarity between simulated spreads
versus a given spread. This is then used to estimate the
probability of a spread given a source via a Gaussian
weighting and therefore we will refer to this method as
the Jaccard-Gaussian algorithm. This method compares
two network states, i.e. two binary vectors (nodes are ei-
ther infected or susceptible) as obtained by Monte Carlo
simulations versus a given final state. To compare two
“micro-states” of networks [13] must generate, store and
compare all (or at least, most) possible realizations of
a spread from every single candidate node. In contrast,
we work with a single probability distribution defined
over the network. Since the space of all possible N -node
states (which [13] samples) is astronomically larger than
the space of single node states (which we sample) we can
leverage this gain in computational cost to sample our
space more accurately. Our approach has another ad-
vantage: a forward model uniquely determines a stencil,
and once we have our stencils for a certain model, we can
use it for multiple C sets, say, for different realizations
of the same disease. [13] on the other hand, must realis-
tically sample an combinatorially larger space for every
realization of the spread. Another difference with [13] is
in our scoring function, specifically, we use an entropic
weight when comparing a single realization to a proba-
bility distribution. This allows us to decide which nodes
to take more seriously than others.
We have implemented the Jaccard-Gaussian algorithm
and its performance is plotted against our method in Fig.
4. The Jaccard-Gaussian algorithm relies upon a conver-
gence condition in order to select the width parameter
used in its Gaussian weighting. We follow the conver-
gence condition defined in the supplementary material of
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FIG. 4. Our method versus Jaccard-Gaussian method
developed by Antulov-Fantulin et al. in [13] on the
scale-free graph (n = 4941, m = 6601). (a): Prob-
ability of finding the true seed within top 1 (light-
red) and top 1% (dark-blue) candidate nodes. Overall,
the Jaccard-Gaussian method has better performance when
λ < 0.5 after which our method is better. In all cases, both
methods were limited to using the same set of 134 simulated
runs (stencil) where each data point was generated from in-
dependent test sets of 500 runs. However, only runs which
satisfies the Jaccard-Gaussian convergence condition (Eq. 3)
were used in these plots. (b): How often a highly ranked
node is the true seed (λ = 0.7, T = 5). Both methods
used the same set (stencil) of 667 simulated runs for their
algorithms. The spectrum is generated from testing the per-
formance of each method for 500 runs. Additionally, the error
bars were generated by randomly selecting 100 runs and cal-
culating the deviation from average across all runs. Therefore,
the error bars represent the expected standard deviation for
a sample size of 100 runs.
[13]:
|Pn(θmap)− P2n(θmap)| ≤ 0.05, (3)
where Pn refers to the candidate probability distribution
using a stencil of n simulated runs and θmap refers to the
most likely candidate node inside P2n. Additionally, the
8two probability distributions were generated from inde-
pendent simulations. We used the same set of potential
Gaussian widths as [13] and selected the smallest weight
for which the convergence condition is satisfied. We gen-
erated a stencil of 200 runs for different values of the
transmission parameter λ and T = 5 and stored these
runs for testing the performance of our algorithm against
the Jaccard-Gaussian algorithm. In all cases, the avail-
able information is the same for both algorithms. How-
ever, the convergence condition for the Jaccard-Gaussian
method limits the stencil set from 200 to 134. Therefore,
we limit our algorithm’s stencils to use the same 134 sim-
ulated runs as well.
To test how the performance is affected by the sten-
cil size, we again generated a stencil set of 1000 runs for
λ = 0.7 and T = 5. The convergence condition lim-
its the final stencil used to 667 runs for both methods.
The spectrum of the true seed’s ranking in both meth-
ods are shown in Fig. 4b. From Fig. 4a the probabil-
ity of finding the true seed (λ = 0.7) for our method
and Jaccard-Gaussian method is 0.5890 ± 0.0419 and
0.3653± 0.0422 respectively. When the stencil size is in-
creased to 667 runs, these scores become 0.5776± 0.0430
and 0.3744±0.0377 for our method and Jaccard-Gaussian
method respectively. Although the Jaccard-Gaussian
method should be improved with a larger stencil size,
the amount of simulations required can be quite large.
We conclude our discussion with the limitations of our
inversion scheme. As usual, there is a trade off between
accuracy and generality. Our method should not be ex-
pected to perform better than methods that are cus-
tom tailored to specific models. By studying the specific
dynamics, one can generate additional constraints and
properties of the dynamics such as tree-topology, exact
analytical solutions, conservation laws, etc, that might
aid in inversion [17, 19]. Furthermore, the performance
of our algorithm can be enhanced by extending what we
have done with 2-body correlations to n-body correla-
tions or time dependent correlations to calculate path
integrals based on Bayesian inference (e.g. [12] for one
specific model). However, generalizing such approaches
for any forward model and any network topology is off-
set by the huge number of simulations required to resolve
the correlations to within a useful error margin, and will
be very costly.
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Appendix - Distance Errors. We calculate, for
the convenience of compare to other authors, the per-
formance of our algorithm based on the distance between
our top candidate and the true seed in Fig. 5, 6, and 7. A
distance error of zero means that we correctly identified
the true seed.
Appendix - Diffusion Sizes. The average size of
the diffusion is plotted for different topology, network,
and transmission probabilities in Fig. 8.
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FIG. 5. Error distance δ for the power grid network (n = 4941, m = 6594). δ is the distance between the top candidate and
the true origin.
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FIG. 6. Error distance δ for the scale-free network (n = 4941, m = 6601). δ is the distance between the top candidate and the
true origin.
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FIG. 7. Error distance δ for the protein interaction network (n = 3744, m = 7749). δ is the distance between the top candidate
and the true origin.
13
S
u
s
c
e
p
ti
b
le
-I
n
fe
c
te
d
In
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 C
a
s
c
a
d
e
0 0.5 1
Transmission Probability λ
10
0
10
2
10
4
A
















0 fffifl 1
Tffi !"#$%&'( )*+,-./1234 λ
10
0
10
2
10
4
5
6
7
8
9
:
;
<
=
>
?
@
B
C
D
F
G
SHIJ
GRID
PKLM C
o
ll
e
c
ti
v
e
 B
e
h
a
v
io
r
D
ir
e
c
ti
o
n
a
l 
B
ia
s
NOQ RUV WXY Z[\
]^_`abc defghijklmno pqrstuvwxyz {
0
10
0
10
2
10
4
|
}
~











Ł


0  1
  ¡¢£¤¥¦ λ
10
0
10
2
10
4
§
¨
©
ª
«
¬
­
®
¯
°
±
²
³
´
µ
¶
·
FIG. 8. Average Diffusion Sizes.
